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Abstract 
The paper investigates the problems related to futurity and modality in modern Greek. The 
discussion of Greek temporal future expressions is conducted with reference to relevant 
literature from the areas of English linguistics, cognitive studies and pragmatics. The focus is 
on the status of future-oriented expressions and the question whether they are primarily 
epistemic in nature, whether they are tense-based, or modality-based. It is argued that the 
future tense in Greek has a modal semantic base conveying epistemic modality and that the 
preferred future prospective reading is a pragmatic development of the semantic modal base. 
The author further suggests that the future reading is a kind of presumptive meaning which 
follows from the neo-Gricean Principle of Informativeness, known as the I-principle (Levinson 
2000) being a generalised interpretation which does not depend on contextual information. 
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1. Setting the scene 
 
It is well known that futurity and modality are interrelated in such a way across 
languages that there is an ongoing debate concerning the status of future tenses as 
markers of tense or of modality (e.g. Comrie 1985, Enç 1996, Sarkar 1998, Ludlow 
1999, Copley 2009, Condoravdi 2002, Squartini 2004, Jaszczolt 2006, Kissine 2008, 
Mari 2009, 2010 Giannakidou & Mari 2012, 2013, 2014). Modern Greek is not different 
in this respect and therefore the question whether the so-called future tense has a 
temporal or a modal basis is still under discussion (see Condoravdi 2002, Giannakidou 
2009, 2012, Giannakidou & Mari 2012, 2013, 2014, Tsangalidis 1999 among others). 
Modern Greek forms a periphrastic future tense by employing the particle tha 
(θα=will), usually referred to as the future marker (see Philippaki-Warburton 1994, 
Rivero 1994 among others) followed by the imperfective non-past or the perfective non-
past verb forms1 (henceforth INP and PNP respectively). Nevertheless, as it will be 
shown, only the combination of tha and the PNP gives the ‘pure’ future interpretation, 
while tha combined with the INP systematically conveys epistemic non-future 
modal readings.  
                                                        
1 In traditional grammar the combination of tha with the PNP is termed ‘simple future’ while the 
combination with the INP is termed ‘future continuous’. 
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In recent work (cf. Giannakidou 2009, 2012, Giannakidou & Mari 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
Tsangalidis 1999), it has been argued that the particle tha is not a typical future tense 
marker. In particular, Giannakidou & Mari (2012, 2013, 2014) propose, among other 
things, that the particle tha is an epistemic modal operator with  
a present (now) perspective. Moreover, the Greek PNP verb form cannot function as an 
independent tense form (Holton et al. 1997) and therefore it is treated as a non-deictic 
time marker. If this line of analysis is correct, and there is nothing in the semantics of tha 
constructions that functions as a future tense marker, we need to account for the future 
prospective reading conveyed by the combination of tha and the PNP. 
Based on this, I argue that the future tense in Greek has a modal semantic base 
conveying epistemic modality, in the spirit of Giannakidou (2009, 2012) and 
Giannakidou & Mari (2012, 2013, 2014), and that the preferred future prospective 
reading is a pragmatic development of the semantic modal base. It can further be 
proposed that the future prospective reading is a kind of presumptive meaning which 
follows from the principles of language use and, more precisely, from the neo-Gricean 
Principle of Informativeness, known as the I-principle (Levinson 2000), since it is not 
part of ‘what is said,’ but it is a generalised interpretation which does not depend on 
contextual information.     
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I focus on the typology and the 
properties of future constructions. In section 3, I outline the current literature focusing on 
the study of future constructions and future-time reference; in section 4, I present the 
neo-Gricean pragmatics theory of communication focusing mainly on the I-principle 
and, finally, in section 5, I further develop the pragmatic analysis of future-time 
reference in Modern Greek.   
 
 
2. Facts on tha-constructions: Epistemic and future uses  
 
 
2.1 Tense, aspect and verb morphology  
 
In Modern Greek the verb form is inflected for the grammatical categories of tense and 
aspect. Following this, there is a morphological distinction between past and non-past, in 
terms of tense, and perfective and imperfective in terms of aspect. The importance of 
aspect in Modern Greek is emphasised by the fact that all tenses, moods and voices are 
marked for either the perfective or the imperfective aspect (Joseph 1983, Holton et al. 
1997, Tsangalidis 1999). The imperfective aspect is used to mark a progressive, habitual 
or repeated action, whereas the perfective aspect marks an action which is perceived as a 
completed whole (Xidopoulos 1996, Holton et al. 1997).  
The combinations of tense and aspect give us four morphologically distinct verb 
forms which are exemplified in the following table (Mackridge 1985, Holton et al. 
1997): 
 
 (1) graf -o (INP)                              (2) * grap -s -o (PNP) 
          write IMP-1SG.NON-PAST         write-PERF.1SG.NON-PAST 
               ‘I am writing (right now).’                  (no exact English equivalent) 
               ‘I write (generally).’ 
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      (3) e-graf  -a (IP)                           (4) e-grap -s -a (PP) 
                  PAST-write-IMP.1SG.PAST            PAST-write-PERF.1SG.PAST 
                 ‘I used to write.’                                ‘I wrote.’ 
                 ‘I was writing.’ 
 
There are two past forms, namely, the imperfective past (IP) in (3) and the perfective 
past (PP) in (4), and two non-past forms, namely, the imperfective non-past (henceforth 
INP) in (1) and the perfective non-past (henceforth PNP) in (2). Traditional grammar 
treats the verb form in (1) as a present tense form, yet Giannakidou (2009) argues that 
non-past verb forms are not simply equivalent to present. The verb form in (2), i.e. the 
PNP, is not possible without the presence of certain particles (such as na, as, tha and an) 
as illustrated in examples (5) - (7) below. This is the reason why it is referred to as the 
‘dependent’ form (Holton et al. 1997: 220).  
 
 (5) *Ο Νikos  grapsi       ena grama                        
       the Nikos  write PNP  a letter   
      ‘Nikos write a letter.’ 
 
 (6) As  grapsi      o    Νikos  ena grama                        
       Let write PNP the Nikos  a  letter   
      ‘Let Nikos write a letter.’ 
 
 (7) Ο   Νikos  tha grapsi      ena grama                        
      the Nikos  will write PNP a letter   
      ‘Nikos will write a letter.’ 
 
In this study we are going to focus on the PNP and INP verb forms since these two 
forms are used in the formation of the future constructions. 
 
 
2.2 The typology of future tense and tha-constructions 
 
As it is obvious from the discussion so far, in Modern Greek, future tense is not 
morphologically marked in the verb form. According to traditional grammar, future 
tense in Modern Greek is formed with the particle tha followed by the PNP (as in 8) or 
INP verb forms (as in 9).  
 
 (8) Ο   Νikos tha   petaksi  gia to Londino.                        
      the Nikos will fly PNP   for the London   
      ‘Nikos will fly to London.’ 
 
  
 (9) Ο  Νikos  tha petai  gia to Londino avrio         
      the Nikos will fly INP  for the London tomorrow  
      ‘Nikos will be flying to London tomorrow.’ 
 
The combination of thα with PNP, as in (8), is used to “express an action which will take 
place and be completed at a future point in time” (Holton et al. 1997: 227). This type of 
future is dubbed in traditional terms as the ‘simple future’. Alternatively, when thα is 
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combined with the INP, as in (9), “it describes an action which will be taking place in 
the future either as a habitual event, or as a continuous, progressive one” (Holton et al. 
1997: 226). 
It has to be noted though that in examples like (9), future-time reference seems to 
arise from the use of the time adverbial ‘avrio’ (Eng. tomorrow). If the adverb is 
removed, and there is no specific context, the future interpretation does not survive.  
 
 (10) Ο  Νikos  tha petai    gia to Londino      
       the Nikos will fly INP for the London   
      ‘Nikos will be flying to London.’ (now) 
 
In such cases, combinations of tha with INP are most frequently interpreted as epistemic 
present (Giannakidou 2012), expressing a highly strong possibility and an inference 
about the state of affairs at the utterance time based on the evidence that the speaker has. 
In such contexts, tha constructions do not have the force of a pure future tense but they 
can be glossed as ‘most probably/possibly’ making reference to the utterance time. 
Giannakidou (2012) and Giannakidou & Mari (2012) also argue that tha, when 
combined with INP, exhibits evidential behaviour and it is very similar to the evidential 
modal ‘prepi’ (Eng. must). In this sense, tha with INP is co-operatively used when the 
speaker lacks direct evidence about the relevant situation. For instance, in example (10) 
by uttering ‘o Νikos tha petai’ (Nikos will be flying), the speaker communicates that he 
does not have direct evidence with regard to the truth of the proposition and that he is 
just making an inference based on indirect evidence.                             
This epistemic present reading can be further reinforced by the use of high 
probability adverbs such as malon (Eng. probably) (cf. Holton et al. 1997, Giannakidou 
& Mari 2012).  
 
 (11) Ο  Νikos  malon   tha petai     gia to Londino      
        the Nikos probably will fly INP for the London   
       ‘Nikos will be probably flying to London.’ (now) 
 
Nevertheless, the epistemic present interpretation is not the preferred one when the verb 
is in the 1st or the 2nd person. Consider the examples:  
 
 (12) ?Tha petao         gia to Londino tora  
        Will fly INP, 1SIN for the London now  
         ?’I will be flying to London now.’ 
 
 (13) ?Tha petas          gia to Londino tora      
        Will fly INP, 2SIN for the London now  
        ?‘You will be flying to London now.’ 
 
 (14) Tha petas       gia to Londino avrio      
        Will fly INP, 2SIN for the London tomorrow 
        ‘You will be flying to London tomorrow.’  
 
The addition of an adverb referring to the utterance time such as ‘tora’ (Eng. now) 
renders examples (12) and (13) odd, if not unacceptable. Yet, there is no problem at all 
with the future time adverb ‘avrio’ (Eng. tomorrow) as in (14). The fact that the 1st and 
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the 2nd person are more likely to express futurity than the third person, which favours 
epistemic present readings, is also observed in Tsangalidis (1999) following Heine 
(1995).  
According to traditional grammars the future tense or simple future, as it is usually 
dubbed, is restricted to the combination of tha followed by the PNP.   
  
 (15) O Nikos    tha  petksi    gia to  Londino      
        The Nikos will fly PNP   for the London   
        ‘Nikos will fly to London.’ (in the future) 
 
The preferred future interpretation of tha with PNP combinations is not determined by 
the presence or absence of an adverb of time as it is the case with tha combined with the 
INP. The time adverbial just anchors the event described by the verb at a specific point 
in the future.  
 
 
 (16) O Nikos   tha petksi gia to Londino avrio/ se tris meres...      
        The Nikos will fly PNP for the London tomorrow/in three days...  
        ‘Nikos will fly to London tomorrow/in three days...’  
 
The only case in which tha and PNP combination does not convey a temporal (future) 
interpretation is when it is used to describe habitual timeless actions or to indicate 
obligation. Consider the examples (17) and (18) respectively (Holton et al. 1997):  
 
 (17) Kathe  proi tha sikothi, tha pji to kafedaki tu, tha djavasi tin efimerida tu ke 
       kata tis 8.30 tha figi gia to grafio tu 
       ‘Every morning he will get up, drink his coffee, read his newspaper and at 
       approximately 8.30 he will leave for the office.’ 
  
 (18) Oxi tha mu to epistrepsis afto to grama amesos!   
        ‘No, you will [must] give this letter back to me immediately.’ 
 
In examples such as (17), adverbs of time such as ‘tora’ (Eng. now), ‘avrio’ (Eng. 
tomorrow) which are always compatible with tha and PNP constructions are not 
acceptable, which shows that a temporal reading is not intended in such contexts.  
 
 
3. Future in Modern Greek: an overview of relevant literature 
 
 
3.1 Particle tha as a future gram-type   
 
Within the framework of a comparative study between will constructions in English and 
tha constructions in Modern Greek, by means of which future-time reference is 
expressed, Tsangalidis (1999) proposes a theory which permits future to be defined 
independently of the core categories of tense and modality.  
More precisely, the analysis in Tsangalidis (1999) is built upon the notion of 
“grammatical morpheme” or “gram-type” introduced in Dahl (1985) and Bybee & Dahl 
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(1989). The term “gram-type” refers to cross-linguistic categories which are instantiated 
in each language by a specific type of “gram”. “Gram” in its turn refers to the notion of 
grammatical morpheme. As Bybee et al. (1994: 2) explain, “grammatical morphemes are 
closed-class elements whose class membership is determined by some unique 
grammatical behaviour, such as position of occurrence, co-occurrence restrictions, or 
other distinctive interactions with other linguistic elements”. Moreover, these 
grammatical morphemes or ‘grams’ may appear in various types in terms of their form, 
ranging from affixes to complex constructions and they are “identifiable by their 
semantic foci” Bybee & Dahl (1989: 52). In this sense the notion of the “gram-type” cuts 
across the traditional categories such as tense, aspect, or mood. 
It is argued that tha is not a typical future tense marker, but it is not a modal operator 
either. Consequently, according to Tsangalidis (1999), tha is best described as an 
instance of the ‘future gram-type’. The semantic content of ‘future gram-types’ indicates 
that “the speaker predicts a situation will occur subsequent to the speech event” (Bybee 
& Dahl 1989: 55). As a result, the category of the ‘future’ can be approached in an 
alternative way, rendering thus irrelevant the debate over its temporal or modal status. 
As Tsangalidis (1999: 255) observes, “future-grams [...] are seen as autonomous entities 
[...] and their definition in terms of polysemic associations of diachronically related 
senses does not exclude their use as markers of temporal, aspectual and modal notions”.      
The main proposal in Tsangalidis (1999) is that the particle tha qualifies neither as a 
prototypical modal, nor as a pure future tense marker. Accordingly, a future-gram type 
status of tha is proposed, which allows for a description independent of membership in 
either a temporal or a modal category. Following Tsangalidis (1999: xi), this line of 
analysis has “advantages over any attempt to decide on the centrality of either tense or 
modality in the semantics of future markers or any attempt to recognize distinct 
underlying elements which only happen to be homophonous in these languages.” 
Concerning the interpretation of tha constructions, Tsangalidis (1999) concludes that: 
a) tha combined with perfective past (PP) gives pure epistemic past readings; b) tha 
combined with the PNP gives pure non-epistemic future readings; and c) all other 
combinations are open to both temporal and modal readings. In addition, it is also put 
forward that “the default interpretation (of tha) is dependent on the form of the lexical 
verb – and crucially on its aspectual and temporal characteristics” (Tsangalidis 
1999: 253).  
Beginning with the dependent form, Tsangalidis (1999) assumes the now widely 
accepted view that it is a typical PNP form and not a subjunctive form2. What is more, 
following the literature on aspect3 according to which perfectives when combined with 
non-past generate a contradiction (since perfective events cannot occur at the same time 
with perfective speech events and therefore, they cannot practically refer to the utterance 
time), Tsangalidis (1999) explains why the PNP can only receive pure future or habitual 
interpretations. Finally, the fact that PNP forms are non-specific and non-past can 
account for their dependent status (Tsangalidis 1999).  
Turning to tha with INP constructions, Tsangalidis (1999) supports that the epistemic 
present reading should not be considered the default one since epistemically modalised 
                                                        
2 The view that ‘dependent’ or ‘γrapso’ forms are not subjunctives is put forward in Veloudis & 
Philippaki-Warburton (1983) and Philippaki-Warburton (1992). 
3 Cf. e.g. Dahl (1985), Comrie (1976, 1985) and Smith (1991). 
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statements about the speaker and the addressee do not normally hold. As a result, it is 
proposed that the combination of tha with INP is underspecified for tense which means 
that tha with INP “does not force a future time reference as such – but rather 
‘prediction’” (Tsangalidis 1999: 212). As it is explained, this prediction normally refers 
to the future (hence the potential future time reference), however, in certain contexts 
(such as the case of statives, progressives and imperfectives) prediction can equally refer 
to the present; in these cases the contribution of the particle tha is epistemic modality 
rather than futurity. What follows then is an ambiguity between future and epistemic 
present time interpretations which, according to Tsangalidis (1999), can be best 
accounted for by the analysis of tha as a ‘future gram-type’. 
 
 
3.2 The Greek future particle as an epistemic modal 
 
In a more recent study, Giannakidou (2009, 2012) and Giannakidou & Mari (2012) put 
forward an alternative analysis of the particle tha and future-time reference in Modern 
Greek. The main proposal is that the particle tha is not a future tense marker but a 
modality operator. This is proposal is based on the non-future readings of tha when 
combined mainly with the INP and the past forms but it is also related to the interaction 
of tha with modal adverbials (Giannakidou 2012).    
To begin with, it is argued that in cases where tha is combined with the INP and the 
PP there is a pure epistemic reading. Consider the examples below (form 
Giannakidou 2012):  
 
 (19) i    Ariadni   tha kimate             tora  
        The Ariadne will sleep INP, 3SIN now 
        ‘Ariadne must be sleeping now.’ 
 
  
 (20) i    Ariadni   tha ine        giatros              
        The Ariadne will be 3SIN doctor 
        ‘Ariadne must be a doctor.’ 
 
In the examples above, the preferred interpretation is epistemic and inferential. The 
speaker expresses a kind of inferential assessment about what Ariadne might be or might 
be doing based on the knowledge and the information that he has. As Giannakidou 
(2012: 51) notes, tha with INP constructions also have “sensitivity to the nature of 
evidence: if I have direct evidence to the truth of the sentence, tha is unacceptable”. 
Furthermore, it is observed that tha co-occurs with adverbs that convey very strong 
possibility and necessity as it happens with the necessity modal ‘prepi’ (must) which can 
also combine with tha as it is illustrated below: 
 
(21) i     Ariadne {malon/#isos} tha prepi  na    efije             
       The  Ariadne probably        will must SUBJ left 
       ‘Ariadne probably must have left.’ 
 
(22) i    Ariadne (tha) prepi na   efije 
       The Ariadne will must SUBJ left 
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       ‘Ariadne probably must have left.’  
 
Giannakidou (2012: 52) claims that “given the co-compatibility of tha and prepi, we 
must conclude that they express matching modalities”. 
Turning now to the combination of tha with the PNP, it is agreed that these 
constructions convey the future interpretation yet as Giannakidou (2012) suggests, they 
are not devoid of the epistemic reading especially when a time adverbial is not present. 
To further illustrate this point the following example is given: 
 
(23) Context: It’s late, the weather is bad, and we know Ariadne is travelling. You 
worry, and I want to reassure you and say:  
                    Min anisixis.               i   Ariadne  tha  ftasi (epistemic) 
                    Not worry IMPER, 2SIN. the Ariadne will arrive PNP, 3SIN 
                    ‘Don’t worry. Ariadne will arrive.’  
 
In such contexts, both interlocutors are not particularly interested in the time of the event 
(temporal reading), instead they are interested in the degree of certainty of the 
occurrence of the event (modal reading). Giannakidou (2012) names interpretations 
related to examples such as (23) epistemic future since on the one hand there is a clear 
forward shifting of the event, but on the other there is also an epistemic reading.  
The absence of future-time reference is also possible in generic, atemporal sentences 
such as the one already discussed in (17), quoted below as (24):  
 
 
 
(24) Kathe proi tha sikothi, tha pji to kafedaki tu, tha djavasi tin efimerida tu ke 
kata tis 8.30 tha figi gia to grafio tu 
‘Every morning he will get up, drink his coffee, read his newspaper and at 
approximately 8.30 he will leave for the office.’ 
 
Here again there is no time adverbial in the utterance. It is therefore argued that in tha 
with PNP combinations the presence of time adverbials determines in a great extent 
whether the epistemic reading will surface or not.   
The claim that tha is not a future tense marker but that it is a modality operator with 
present perspective is thoroughly discussed in a study focusing on the dependency of the 
PNP form. Giannakidou (2009) observes that ‘non-past’ forms in Modern Greek are not 
equivalent to a present. More specifically, the INP is not a present tense but it is “used 
for habitual and generic statements, as well as to denote progressive and ongoing events” 
(Giannakidou 2009: 1896).  Now, in cases where the imperfective is used for the 
progressive, it denotes the function PROG. By contrast, when used generically, the 
imperfective contributes GEN. The output is an interval during which generic 
quantification takes place (Giannakidou 2009). It is therefore assumed that the INP does 
not make reference to a specific time. 
The PNP cannot function as a present tense either. It is suggested (Giannakidou 
2009, 2012) that the dependent nature of the PNP is attributed to its inability to make 
reference to the utterance time. As it is proposed, the PNP contains a time interval (t, ∞) 
whose left boundary t is a non-deictic variable. Following this, non-past in Modern 
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Greek should have the following semantic representation introduced in Abusch (2004) 4 
(Giannakidou 2009: 1899): 
 
 (25) [non-past] = λP λt P((t, ∞)) 
 
In Abusch’s (2004) analysis since t is a non-deictic variable, it must be bound by n 
(PRES, utterance time) in order to be licensed. In a real present tense this variable 
receives its n ‘now’ value (referring to the utterance time) from a PRES feature. 
Nevertheless, “the Greek non-past contains no higher temporal information, that is, no 
PRES and it will thus require some other element to supply n” (Giannakidou 2009: 
1899). As a result, the PNP is treated as a temporal polarity item which will need a 
particular licensing context in order to receive the missing n or PRES feature and 
therefore, to acquire a time value 
In the case of the INP, which conveys either a generic or a progressive interpretation, 
it is the time adverbials that provide the relevant time interval which replaces (t, ∞). By 
way of illustration consider the example (in Giannakidou 2009): 
 
 (26) O Jianis grafi sixna 
          ‘John writes often.’   
          OFTENt [t∊ C∧ t ⊆ i: write (j, t) ∧ i = (t, ∞)] 
     
As Giannakidou (2009: 1900) suggests, “[i]n this sense, the problematic interval (t, ∞) is 
replaced by the generic interval i... and the result is a statement with no direct reference 
to the utterance time”. In the same fashion, adverbials or temporal expressions like tora 
(Eng. now) or olo to proi (Eng. all morning) provide a time interval which binds the 
variable t giving thus the progressive readings.    
The explanation described above does not yet hold for the PNP. Consider example 
(27): 
 
 (27) *O Jianis γrapsi PNP  sixna / tora / olo to proi 
            ‘John writes often / now / all morning.’   
  
The addition of adverbials or temporal expressions does not improve the illicit PNP. 
Therefore, the need for n to be introduced still remains. Giannakidou (2009, 2012) 
suggests that the PNP receives n from particles such as tha. This motivates the 
introduction of a Now-TP into the syntactic structure with tha being its head (Now-T). 
This syntactic structure is illustrated in the following example: 
 
(28) Now-TP:   ∃e [win (j,e)  ∧ e ⊆ (n, ∞) ] 
  
 
 
 
            Now-T:  tha: n        TP: λt ∃e [win (j,e)  ∧ e ⊆ (t, ∞) ] 
                                                    “kerδisi o Janis” 
                                                        
4 According to Abusch (2004: 39), ‘‘in the substitution operator, t is a bound variable that 
corresponds to the tense argument of will. For a top-level occurrence of will, the effect is to 
substitute (n, ∞) for n.’’ 
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It is thus suggested that the particle tha semantically functions as the present tense5 - 
which is missing from the PNP verb form - and at the same time provides a satisfying 
explanation for the dependency of the PNP to particles such as tha.   
Eventually, concerning the future-time interpretation of tha constructions 
Giannakidou (2012) and Giannakidou & Mari (2012) argue that it crucially depends on 
the time adverbials as well as the (t, ∞) interval which is available in the non-past forms. 
More accurately, it is put forward the presence of an adverb “provides direct evidence 
about a time, and this time serves to constrain the temporal space for the location of the 
eventuality denoted by the VP” (Giannakidou & Mari 2012: 267). Therefore, there is a 
domain restriction which generates the future reading giving thus the force of a 
prediction. By contrast, when there is no adverb we can have either an epistemic present 
or an epistemic future interpretation. In the first case, “the time of the evaluation of the 
VP coincides with tu (utterance time). On the epistemic future reading, the time of the 
evaluation of the VP is forward shifted [...] possibly because of the non-past which 
makes available the interval (t, ∞) anyway” (Giannakidou & Mari 2012: 268).   
To sum up, it is agreed that tha is not a pure future tense marker. In contrast to 
Tsangalidis (1999), who suggests that tha does not qualify as a modal either, but that it is 
an autonomous entity (a future-gram), Giannakidou (2012) and Giannakidou & Mari 
(2012, 2013 and 2014) argue that tha is an epistemic modal operator which is temporally 
anchored at the utterance time. Moreover, evidence appears to play an important role in 
the final interpretation of tha sentences according to the analyses presented. Evidence, 
either concerning the temporality of the event (in the form of an adverb of time) or the 
eventuality itself, is what narrows down the temporal domain and triggers future 
readings.    
 
 
4. Futurity communicated: Towards a pragmatic analysis  
 
In the accounts presented here the future readings of tha sentences arise as a result of 
their semantic meaning along with the interaction of the immediate linguistic context 
(adverbs of time, etc.).  
Nevertheless, a closer look at the data shows that the presence of a tha construction is 
neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for future-time reference6. This can be 
interpreted in two ways; on the one hand, as has already been shown, tha constructions 
can convey purely epistemic readings, for instance, when tha is combined with the INP 
as in (29) or the PP.  
  
 (29) i    Ariadni   tha kimate             tora  
        The Ariadne will sleep INP, 3SIN now 
         ‘Ariadne must be sleeping now.’ 
 
What is more, even tha with PNP, which is considered the typical ‘future’ construction, 
does not convey a temporal (future) interpretation in generic contexts.  
                                                        
5 Apart from tha, the so-called future particle, the semantic function of the present tense is also 
given by the subjunctive na, the optative as and conditional an (Giannakidou 2009). 
6 Comrie (1985) argues the same for the use of the auxiliary will in English.   
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 (30) Kathe fora pu   tha vreksi PNP o dromos plimirizi  
        Every time   that will rain        the street  floods 
        ‘Every time that rains the street floods.’  
 
On the other hand, future-time reference can also be communicated by other means 
without the use of the tha constructions. Consider the case where the INP verb form 
(traditionally referred to as present tense) is used to refer to a future event: 
 
 (31) To treno anachori stis 10       
         ‘The train departs at 10.” 
 
In addition, na constructions, which typically express subjunctive mood, also usually 
convey reference to the future. 
 
 (32) i Eleni etimazetai na SUBJ pai sto Londino  
        ‘Eleni prepares for going to London.’  
  
It becomes evident then that future-time reference is not marked by a particular form. It 
is not part of the coded linguistic content. On the contrary, as I will propose here, it 
follows as a conversationally communicated interpretation based on the semantic 
information of what is coded.  
More precisely, I agree that tha always contributes an epistemic modal semantic base 
(in the spirit of Giannakidou (2012) and Giannakidou & Mari (2012)) and I shall argue 
that: a) the non-past, non-present (i.e. future-time) reading of tha with INP arises as a 
temporal domain restriction due to the presence of direct evidence (such as time 
adverbials, 1st/2nd person), and b) the non-past, non-present reading of tha with PNP, 
arises as a default, i.e. pragmatically enriched and a more informative reading of the 
modal semantic base, and that it is not influenced by the presence of a time adverbial. A 
way forward is to suggest that future-time reference in Modern Greek arises as a kind of 
presumptive meaning7 related to the I-principle as developed and discussed in Levinson 
(2000).  
 
 
4.1 The neo-Gricean I-implicature 
 
In a reductionist variant of the original Gricean theorizing (Grice 1975, 1989), Levinson 
(1987, 1991, 1995, 2000) proposes three basic heuristics or principles which license 
default interpretations. These are the I-principle (‘say as little as necessary’), the Q-
principle (‘do not say less than you know’) and the M-principle (‘Do not use a prolix, 
obscure or marked expression without reason’). Here, I will focus on the I-principle 
which is originally defined as follows: 
 
(33)  
The I-Principle (Levinson 2000: 114-115) 
Speaker’s Maxim: The Maxim of Minimization. 
                                                        
7 The idea that tenses generate implicatures and therefore there is a need for a pragmatic account is 
not a novel one, cf. Comrie (1985).  
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‘Say as little as necessary’, i.e. produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to 
achieve your communicational ends (bearing the Q-principle in mind). 
Recipient’s corollary: The enrichment rule. 
Amplify the informational content of the speaker’s utterance, by finding the most 
specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended point. 
Specifically: 
(a) Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or  events, unless (i) 
this is inconsistent with what is taken for granted; (ii) the speaker has broken the 
Maxim of Minimization by choosing a prolix expression. 
(b) Assume the existence of actuality of what a sentence is ‘about’ if that is 
consistent with what is taken for granted. 
(c) Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential 
parsimony). 
(d) Assume the existence or actuality of what the sentence is about   if that is 
consistent with what is taken for granted.  
 
The central idea behind the I-principle is that the use of a semantically general 
expression I-implicates a semantically specific interpretation. More accurately, the 
implicature engendered by the I-principle is one that accords best with the most 
stereotypical and explanatory expectation given our knowledge about the world. The I-
principle covers a variety of inferences such as inference to the stereotype (34) and 
conjunction buttressing (35) among others (cf Levinson 2000: 117 for more examples). 
 
 (34) Paul was waiting for the nurse to give him his medicine  
   +> Paul was waiting for the female nurse to give him his medicine 
 
 (35) Paul pressed the button and the lights turned on     
   +> Paul pressed the button and then the lights turned on  
   +> Paul pressed the button and therefore the lights turned on  
    
In (34) an I-implicature is triggered by the stereotypically held expectation that a nurse is 
most of the times a female nurse, while in (35), the use of ‘and’ can implicate temporal 
sequence or causal connectedness.   
Despite the great variation among I-inferences, they share certain common 
properties8. As mentioned above, I-inferences are inferences to more specific 
interpretations. Moreover, they are positive in nature. As Levisnon (2000: 119) notes, 
“the extension of what is implicated is a proper subset of the extension of what is said, 
the extension being restricted positively”. In addition, I-inferences do not refer to 
something that could have been said but was not said as it is the case with the other neo-
Gricean implicatures which are based on scales. The default readings given by the I-
principle are inferences from structure and meaning to further presumptive meanings. As 
Levinson (2000: 22) notes, they are “based not on direct computations about speaker-
intention, but rather on general expectations about how language is normally used”.  
 
 
                                                        
8 I-inferences also exhibit the typical properties of all non-monotonic inferences, namely, 
defeasibility, non-detachability, calculability, conventionality and reinforcability. 
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5. A neo-Gricean account of future-time reference in Modern 
Greek 
 
Based on the discussion so far, I would like to propose a partial neo-Gricean pragmatics 
apparatus for the interpretation of future-time reference in Modern Greek, which is 
spelled out in (36) below: 
 
(36)  
A neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus for the interpretation of future-time reference in 
Modern Greek. 
(a) particle tha contributes an epistemic modal semantic base (in the sense of 
Giannakidou 2012 and Giannakidou & Mari 2012). 
(b) Interpretation principle  
i. The combination of tha with the INP, and in the absence of any particular 
context, will express an epistemic modal interpretation referring to the 
utterance time, unless there is direct evidence available (time adverbials, 
1st/2nd person, physical evidence). In this case, the non-past modal base is 
temporally restricted to non-past, non-present contributing thus an 
epistemic future reading.  
ii. The combination of tha with the PNP will I-implicate a more specific 
future interpretation. 
 
Armed with this apparatus, let me now return to the original question addressed at the 
beginning of the paper, a question of how hearers induce future readings of thα 
constructions despite the fact the latter do not have unambiguous future-time reference 
as part of their semantic, coded, meaning. Let me start from the combinations of tha with 
the INP. Considering the following example: 
 
 (37) i    Eleni tha kimate   jafto mi tin  paris tilefono     
         the Eleni will sleep INP so     not her call 
         ‘Helen will be sleeping, so don’t call her.’ 
 
In the absence of any specific context, (37) will receive a preferred epistemic present 
interpretation. Thus the hearer confronted with such an utterance makes an inference 
about the state of affairs at the utterance time. The epistemic modal reading follows from 
the proposed evidential nature of tha at the semantic level of interpretation (see 
Giannakidou 2009, Giannakidou & Mari 2012). More accurately, the speaker based on 
indirect evidence assumes that Helen will be sleeping at the utterance time (for instance 
the speaker may be aware of Helen’s habits, plans, etc.).  
Consider now the case in which Helen is present when the speaker utters (37). In this 
case, the epistemic present reading is not possible since the speaker has direct evidence 
(based on physical contact) that Helen is not sleeping. As already noted, physical 
evidence is in fact strong direct evidence possessed by the speaker and thus, the non-past 
modal base will be temporally restricted (in the spirit of Giannakidou 2012) to non-past, 
non-present. The epistemic reading remains, but it refers to the future.   
Equally, the epistemic present reading is blocked when there is a time adverbial, as in 
(38) or the subject is in the first or second person, as in (39). 
 
368 Michael Chiou 
 
 (38) i    Eleni tha  kimate   avrio  
            the Eleni will sleep INP tomorrow.  
         ‘Helen will be sleeping tomorrow.’ 
 
 (39) Epidi     tha  taksidevo      den borume na vrethoume. 
         Because will travel INP, 1ST  not can       to meet   
                     ‘Because I will be travelling, we can’t meet.’ 
 
In (38), the speaker by using the time adverb avrio (Eng. tomorrow) indicates that he is 
in possession of some direct evidence about the time of the event. This evidence will 
serve as a domain restrictor for tha shifting its eventuality towards the future 
(Giannakidou 2009, Giannakidou & Mari 2012). What is more, in example (39), it is 
obvious that the speaker definitely has direct evidence about himself at any given time. 
Thus, the speaker cannot make inferences about himself or even about the hearer at the 
utterance time. As already noted, the fact that the first and the second person are more 
likely to express futurity than the third person is also observed in Tsangalidis (1999 
following Heine 1995). In particular, Heine (1995: 25) notes that “epistemic (present) 
modality correlates most strongly with third-person and least strongly with first-person.” 
This tendency is compatible with the evidential nature of tha constructions.   
Epistemic present interpretations do not normally go through in the 1st and the 2nd 
person contexts. Yet, there are cases in which future-time reference is possible (see 
Tsangalidis 1999: 212). 
 
 (40) tha kimame- INP,1ST akoma jafto den katalaveno ti mu les.   
‘I will still be asleep and that is why I can’t understand what you are talking 
about.’ 
 
As Tsangalidis (1999) notes, the epistemic present reading of the 1st and the 2nd person in 
examples such as (40), although possible, is not the default one, but it always needs a 
particular context to arise. 
Let us now focus on the combination of tha with the PNP which is the ‘pure’ future 
tense in Modern Greek. At the risk of redundancy, it is important to recall that in terms 
of temporality tha with PNP sentences are used in the majority of cases (apart from the 
timeless or atemporal constructions examined earlier in the discussion) to denote that the 
time of the event follows the time of the utterance (futurity) whereas in certain restricted 
contexts they can also receive a timeless or atemporal interpretation. Nevertheless, tha 
with PNP sentences can never indicate an event overlapping with the time of the 
utterance despite containing a [–past]9 verb form. Following our apparatus, the default 
future interpretation of tha with PNP constructions is an I-inference. Consequently, 
sentence (41) will I-implicate (42), (+> stands for ‘implicates’):   
 
 (41) i     Eleni  tha  fiji    
       The Eleni will leave PNP 
       ‘Helen will leave.’ 
 
                                                        
9 This also shows that in Modern Greek the category [-past], which does not produce reference to 
the utterance time is distinct from the category [+present], which does. 
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 (42) +> i Eleni den ehi fiji akoma   
           ‘Helen hasn’t left yet.’  
 
The coded content of (41) can be spelled out as follows: The particle tha is a modal 
operator and semantically contributes n (i.e. the utterance time) hence it has a present 
perspective. The PNP, after receiving n from the particle tha, denotes an open forward 
looking interval, namely, (n, ∞). Hence, the coded content of tha with the PNP is non-
past, including thus the utterance time (present) and also giving the possibility of a future 
reading. Nevertheless, what is actually communicated is the future reading. In other 
words, at the level of interpretation tha with the PNP conveys the non-past, non-present 
reading ‘Helen hasn’t left yet’, which is a narrowing down of what is said. This 
interpretation arises as an I-enriched, more specific, temporal interpretation. The 
interpretation in (42) is more specific and more informative in the sense that from the 
non-past the speaker will I-implicate a non-past, non-present (i.e. future) reading.  
Turning now to the role of adverbs, as we have seen in tha with INP constructions, the 
presence of an adverb of time which encodes future time forward shifts the eventuality. 
Nevertheless, this is not the case with tha with PNP sentences. The interpretation 
associated with the use of tha with PNP appears to be strong and generalised in the sense 
that it does not depend on any kind of context (such as time adverbs, etc.). In other 
words, it is not a one off interpretation based on a particular situation.  
  
 (43) i     Eleni  tha  fiji          avrio 
       The Eleni will leave PNP tomorrow 
       ‘Helen will leave tomorrow.’ 
      +> i Eleni den ehi fiji akoma   
        ‘Helen hasn’t left yet.’  
 
I would agree therefore with Jaszczolt (2006) that a sentence such as (41) evokes the 
same sense of futurity with (43), and I would also suggest that they give rise to the same 
I-implicated future interpretation.   
It can be argued that here the role of time adverbs is not to convey future-time 
reference, but to indicate that the speaker has more evidence about the state of affairs 
described by the verb. By presenting more evidence about the time the speaker actually 
minimises the possibility of proposition p being a non-possible world. Thus, the 
evidence provided by the adverb of time weakens the potential epistemic interpretation 
which is always possible given the modal semantic base of the construction. In this 
sense, the speaker appears more committed to the truth of the proposition expressed and 
he intends reference to the future time in the real world without reference to possible 
worlds (epistemic modal reading).   
 
 
5.1 Arguments for an I-inference 
 
The future interpretation of tha with the PNP, as seen so far, has the hallmarks of an I-
inference. Let us recall here a typical case of an I-inference, namely, conjunction 
buttressing. 
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 (44) Paul pressed the button and the lights turned on     
   +> Paul pressed the button and then the lights turned on  
   +> Paul pressed the button and therefore the lights turned on 
 
In (44) the I-principle allows us to enrich the interpretation of a conjunction to a more 
informative temporal sequential, or causal, relation. In the same sense, in the case of 
future-time reference, from the non-past modal semantic base the speaker infers a non-
past, non-present (i.e. future) temporal reading. Thus, future readings in Modern Greek  
are parasitic on and additional to semantic information and they exhibit a typical 
property of I-inferences in that, as Levinson put it (2000: 116), “they do not just entail 
what is said but they introduce semantic relations absent from what is said, and in that 
sense can be said to reshape the proposition expressed.”  
Moreover, the future reading of tha with the PNP is stereotypical. In essence, there is 
a strong presumption that tha with PNP is understood as clearly future oriented and 
therefore, if the speaker had intended another interpretation but the future one, the 
speaker should have used a different way of saying it. In other words, it would be 
redundant to spell out more explicitly the future reading of examples like (41) and this is 
a typical property of I-inferences (Levinson 2000). Finally, the future interpretation has a 
positive nature in the sense that “the extension of what is implicated is a proper subset of 
the extension of what is said” (Levinson 2000: 119). 
The future-time I-implicature, being a non-monotonic inference, is also expected to 
exhibit the key properties of conversational implicatures. At first, the future 
interpretation of tha with PNP is defeasible in certain contexts. By way of illustration, 
consider (45) and (46). 
 
 (45) i     Eleni  tha  fiji          avrio 
        The Eleni will leave PNP tomorrow 
        ‘Helen will leave tomorrow.’ 
        +> i Eleni den ehi fiji akoma   
          ‘Helen hasn’t left yet.’  
 
 (46) i     Eleni  tha  fiji          avrio        an den ehi  fiji  idi  
        The Eleni will leave PNP tomorrow if   not has left already 
        ‘Helen will leave tomorrow if she isn’t already gone.’ 
        (implicature ‘Helen hasn’t left yet.’ is cancelled by the additional premises)      
 
Here, the future I-implicature in (45) is cancelled in (46) since it is overtly denied 
without any obvious contradiction.  
However, it has to be noted here that cancellation is not possible in contexts where 
there is direct physical evidence. For example, if (45) is uttered while Helen is present in 
the discussion, the speaker cannot overtly cancel the implicated content by adding ‘if she 
isn’t already gone’ since the speaker can see that Helen is still there with him. This 
phenomenon is also observed in other implicature types such as the Quantity 
implicatures.  
      
 (47) a) Some of the cars are red  
        b) +> not all of the cars are red 
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The utterance in (47a) will normally convey the assumption in (47b). This happens 
because the use of some (which is semantically weak) instead of its contrastive semantic 
alternate, namely, all (which is semantically stronger) will implicate the negation of the 
interpretation associated with the use of the stronger expression, i.e. not all. Hence, in a 
rational and co-operative exchange, if the speaker knew that all of the cars were red, the 
speaker should have said so. The reading in (47b) being conversationally implicated can 
be explicitly cancelled without contradiction.   
 
 (48) a) Some of the cars are red, in fact all of them are 
         (‘not all of the cars are red’ is cancelled) 
 
Now, imagine that the speaker is looking at ten cars only four of which are red. In this 
case, direct evidence would block the cancelation context since indeed only some of the 
cars are red and therefore the speaker could not go on to suggest that in fact all of them 
are red since this would not be consistent with evidence in the real world.      
Moreover, as noted above, the future-time interpretation is not attached to the form of 
tha constructions. In other words, a future-time reading can be successfully conveyed 
without the use of a tha construction. 
 
 (49) i Eleni etimazetai na SUBJ pai sto Londino  
‘Helen prepares for going to London.’  
+> i Eleni den ehi pai sto Londino akoma   
‘Helen hasn’t gone to London yet.’ 
 
 (50) As fiji i Eleni de me niazi  
‘Let Helen leave, I don’t mind.’  
+> i Eleni den ehi fiji akoma  
‘Helen hasn’t left yet.’  
  
The primary reading of (49) and (50) is subjunctive and optative respectively, yet they 
both have a secondary future interpretation which is parasitic on the semantic 
information involved. This future reading is also defeasible as it happens in tha with 
PNP combinations. Future-time reference is also possible with the present tense verb 
form10.  
 
 (51) i     Eleni  fevji   avrio 
The Eleni leaves tomorrow 
‘Helen will leave tomorrow.’ 
 
                                                        
10 Jaszczolt (2011: 4) notes that “the present is used to convey a pragmatic overlay pertaining to 
the degree of commitment to the truth of the ensuing event or the degree of planning; the overall 
message reads to the effect that, other things being equal, this is what has been planned for 
tomorrow, or this is what is intended for tomorrow. In short, although the present verb form is 
not the default way of referring to the future in either of the languages under discussion, it can be 
applied for this task for the purpose of increasing the degree of commitment on the part of the 
speaker”.  
372 Michael Chiou 
 
In such cases, however, the future reading seems to be conditioned by the presence of 
the adverb of time since in the absence of an adverb, the time of reference is the 
utterance time. 
Finally, the future-time reading can also be reinforced with no sense of redundancy. 
Consider the example.   
 
 (52) i     Eleni  tha  fiji          avrio,       den exi fiji akoma 
The Eleni will leave PNP tomorrow not has left yet 
‘Helen will leave tomorrow, she hasn’t left yet.’ 
 
It is shown then that the future-time interpretation of tha with PNP constructions is 
pragmatically induced and it is not part of what is coded. In particular, the future reading 
arises as a default I-implicature which expresses a more informative reading of the 
modal semantic base. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and further implications 
 
In this paper, I have considered a pragmatic analysis of future-time reference in Modern 
Greek. I mainly examined the distributional basic facts of tha with PNP and tha with 
INP sentences and I presented the current accounts in the literature. Based mainly on the 
analysis proposed by (Giannakidou 2009, 2012 and Giannakidou & Mari 2012), I argued 
for a generalized pragmatic account for future-time reference in Modern Greek in terms 
of the neo-Gricean pragmatic theoretical framework in the spirit of Levinson (2000). 
More precisely, assuming that tha constructions contribute an epistemic modal semantic 
base (Giannakidou 2009, 2012 and Giannakidou & Mari 2012), I claimed that future 
interpretations of tha with PNP combinations arise as I-implicatures. In essence, it was 
proposed that given the semantic base, future-time reference arises as a default 
implicature from the lack of further specification to the lack of need for it.   
Finally, this paper has two major implications for current thinking on future-time 
reference. In the first place, what is actually proposed is that future-time reference is a 
special case of modality and that the future reading arises when it is more informative 
than the epistemic modal one. The idea that future time reference can be modal is not 
novel. More precisely, Giannakidou (2009, 2012) and Giannakidou & Mari (2012) also 
argue that future is a kind of epistemic modality and more specifically that it is related to 
evidentiality. What is more, Jaszczolt (2006), in an analysis of the English will within 
the Default Semantics framework, suggests that the different readings of will can be 
better explained by a scale of epistemic modality11 showing thus that future-time 
reference can be modal. 
Secondly, it appears that future-time reference is a product of the division of labour 
between semantics and pragmatics. The coded content of the traditionally called ‘future 
tense’ is non-past, epistemic and it makes reference to possible worlds, leaving also open 
the possibility of a future reading. Nevertheless, what is actually communicated is a 
default non-past, non-present meaning, which is a subset of the meaning of the semantic 
base. The future interpretation arises then as an I-enriched more specific, temporal 
                                                        
11 For more arguments for temporality as epistemic modality see also Jaszczolt (2009, 2013). 
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interpretation based on the semantic content of what is said and it is consistent with what 
the speaker intends to communicate. 
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